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Abstract 
In recent years, importance on software security technologies has been recognized and various types of technologies have been 
developed. On the other hand, in spite of recognition of necessity of providing cases that deal with full life cycle for secure software 
development, only few are reported. This paper describes a case-based management system (CBMS) that consists of an artifact 
management system and a knowledge-based management system (KBMS) to manage cases for secure software development. The 
former manages the artifacts created in secure software life cycle. The latter manages software security knowledge. The case-based 
management system also manages association between artifacts and software security knowledge and supports both visualization 
among software security knowledge and between artifacts and software security knowledge. We conducted an experiment to 
evaluate the system. We describe the effectiveness and future work of the system. 
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1. Introduction 
The number of services available on the Internet is increasing. This trend will continue because of the spread of 
mobile terminals and/or information electronics in the near future. Along with this trend, computer security becomes 
increasingly important. In recent years, as increasing number of services has been implemented using software, and 
with increasing software complexity, the importance not only of network security technologies such as encryption or 
access control technology, but also of software security technologies has been recognized [7]. Software security deals 
with security during the whole software development process [7], that is, it is not simply embedded in the network 
security technologies in a software system but is built into the software system through various types of security 
activities. Various types of technologies for secure software development have been developed, such as processes, 
principles, patterns, and guidelines. 
However, since software engineers are not experts on security in general, they do not know what kind of knowledge 
exists and how it should be used. Therefore, necessity to cases that address the whole life cycle of secure software 
development is advocated [1]. However, there are only few such cases. 
Apvrille and Pourzandi showed example artifacts for secure software development of which task is an instant 
messaging service, that is, artifacts for security requirement analysis, architecture design, and so on. They also showed 
some topics. However, the topics remain fragmentary and they are not associated with artifacts.  
The SHIELDS project aims to construct a repository-based secure software engineering environment [4]. The goal 
of the project is to store and share security models that represent the expertise of experts. For that purpose, the project 
provided a modeling tool. However, association of artifacts with software security knowledge does not seem to 
mention. 
By storing both software security knowledge and artifacts created by secure software development and associating 
them as case, we can support software engineers who are not always experts in software security. To manage such 
cases, a case-based management system (CBMS) is required. 
This paper proposes a CBMS for secure software development that manages software security knowledge and 
artifacts created by secure software development and associates them as case. In addition, as we conducted a small 
experiment to show effectiveness of the system, we show some results.  
2. Requirements for CBMS 
We discuss requirements for CBMS. We identified the following six requirements. Requirements from (1) to (4) 
are those from our previous study [5]. 
(1) The system should be able to manage artifacts (those that do not consider security fully) that are inputs for secure 
software development and outputs from that development. Meaning to manage artifacts that are inputs for secure 
software development corresponds to the misuse case by Sindre and Opdahl. Their method proposes to extract normal 
use cases at first, then extract misuse cases. 
(2) The system should allow users to register, revise, and/or delete knowledge for secure software development, for 
example, methods, patterns, standards, and so on.  
(3) The system should allow users to register, revise, and/or delete the rationale for artifacts. The system should enable 
to associate relationship of the rationale with the artifacts and relationship of the rationale with the knowledge used to 
prepare the artifacts.  
(4) The system should allow users to give annotations to artifacts. Annotations are also associated with the knowledge. 
(5) Visualization support of the whole structure of software security knowledge: This is a requirement that emerged 
from the result of our previous experiment. All of software security knowledge are instances of classes in Fig. 2. The 
whole structure forms a large-scaled and complicated network structure. When a user accesses knowledge, (s)he selects 
the type of knowledge (s)he wants to access, then knowledge is shown in a tabular form in the experiment. Therefore, 
a participant said that it was easy to retrieve knowledge (s)he wanted. On the other hand, another participant said that 
it was difficult to retrieve necessary knowledge if (s)he did not have knowledge fully. To solve these problems, it is 
necessary to identify the type of each knowledge in a direct manner. In addition, the system is required to show the 
holistic view of the knowledge base. At this time, what should be done, that is, process should be placed at the starting 
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point, and then related knowledge is placed. Furthermore to show degree of usage, knowledge that was frequently 
used should be identifiable. 
(6) Visualization support between artifacts and software security knowledge 
This requirement also comes from the result from our previous experiment. As described before, we suppose to 
associate an artifact with the knowledge that was used to prepare the artifact. The degree of abstract differs artifact by 
artifact. In the experiment, discussions regarding how detailed requirement specification should be written were 
exchanged. In order to trace that different abstract level of knowledge is reflected to development, all artifacts should 
be managed and traceability should be maintained.   
3. A case-based management system for secure software development  
This section describes a case-based management system for secure software development. It is consisted of a 
knowledge-based management system (KBMS) and an artifacts management system. 
Fig. 1 shows an overall architecture of the system. The figure shows the system manages both artifacts (requirement 
(1)) and software security knowledge (requirement (2)). It also shows that the system associates knowledge with 
artifacts (requirement (3)) and review comments (requirement (4)). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Configuration of our case-based management system 
3.1. Knowledge-based management system 
The KBMS provides the following functions: registration of software security knowledge, modification of it, 
deletion of it, association among pieces of knowledge and browsing of knowledge. This is a solution to requirement 
(2). 
Fig. 2 shows knowledge types and their relationships. The model is an extension to that by Barnum and McGraw 
[2]. Barnum and McGraw proposed a knowledge model for secure software development. Their model is consisted of 
seven classes and their relationships. We think their model lacks some important concepts for secure software 
development, that is, process (and its components) and security pattern. Therefore we proposed a model that is 
extension to that by Barnum and McGraw. 
z Visualization of holistic view of KB 
Our KB is organized by instances of classes as shown in Fig. 3 (Fig. 3 shows a part of the whole knowledge base). 
It forms a very complicated network structure where nodes represent knowledge and links represent relationships 
between pieces of knowledge. It is therefore necessary to support visualization that represents the structure in a direct 
manner. In particular, a “process” describing what activities need to be done is displayed as a starting point (tree 
structure of the left hand side in Fig. 3 shows the CLASP process [13]), then the related pieces of knowledge are 
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associated. As Fig. 2 shows, there are ten types of knowledge regarding software security. Instances of each type are 
identifiable by color. This is a solution to requirement (5). When a user selects a node (s)he would like to access, the 
details of the knowledge and a list of artifacts that use the knowledge are shown. Visualization is implemented by 
using D3 [10]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Schema of software security knowledge base 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Visualized software security knowledge base (excerpt) 
3.2. Artifacts management system 
In general, dependence relationships exist between artifacts created in software development. This applies to secure 
software development. Countermeasures extracted in secure requirement analysis have to be designed, then 
implemented as code. To support this, we represent relationships between artifacts explicitly (requirement (6)). We 
also visualize relationships between artifacts and pieces of knowledge used in preparing them (Fig. 4). In Fig. 4, 
squares represent artifacts, circles represent knowledge, and a link between an artifact and knowledge shows what 
kind of knowledge is used to prepare an artifact. This figure shows some prepared artifacts (“misuse case,” and “secure 
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code”) of secure software development by some participants and relationships between artifacts and knowledge used 
to prepare them. We can see some pieces of knowledge such as “session management” and “password brute force” are 
used by some participants from the central part in Fig. 4 (surrounded by red line).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Visualization of relationships between artifacts and software security knowledge used 
4. Experiment 
We conducted an experiment to show usefulness of our case-based management system. 
4.1. Overview of the experiment 
We describe an overview of the experiment. 
(1) Objectives 
Objectives of the experiment are the following three points: 
1) Usefulness evaluation of using cases 
2) Usefulness evaluation of visualizing relationships among software security knowledge and those between software 
security knowledge and artifacts 
3) Usefulness evaluation of associating software security artifacts with software security knowledge for a task as 
rationale  
(2) Procedure 
Each participant creates software security artifacts by referring to a case and knowledge base as input. Each 
participant is asked to create a case of his secure software development that is consisted of artifacts and association of 
the artifacts with software security knowledge that referred to prepare the artifacts. By development referring to the 
stored case and software security knowledge, we clarify (1) and (2) of the objectives of this experiment. By the 
participants registering their case, we clarify (3) of the objectives of this experiment. We describe the knowledge base 
provided for this experiment in (5) of this sub-section and the case provided for this experiment in (6) of this sub-
section. 
(3) Participants 
We asked two students of our laboratory for tackling the task. One is the third year undergraduate student (we call 
him A). Another is the fourth year undergraduate student (we call him B). Both students have experiences on software 
development in the form of Project-Based Learning (PBL). 
(4) Task 
Mis-use case
Mis-use case
Mis-use case
Mis-use case
Logging
S ecure code
P re questionnaire
P ost questionnaire
P ost questionnaire
Mis-use case
Mis-use case
S ession mgmt
R equirement analysis
Mis-use case
Application
Measure to C S R F
1097 Masahito Saito et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  60 ( 2015 )  1092 – 1100 
The task is a web application development that informs lab members of events or duty in a lab using JSP and Servlet 
technologies. In this experiment, we asked the participants for developing the following two functions only, 
registration of events and browsing of them. 
(5) Knowledge base used in the experiment 
For constructing our KB, we use existing materials that are public and available on the Web. We registered the 
following contents 
z Process: we adopt the Comprehensive, Lightweight Application Security Process (CLASP) [13] because it 
addresses a full lifecycle. We also adopt the security requirement analysis method by Okubo and Tanaka [11] (an 
extension to the method by Sindre and Opdahl). We position this method as part of the CLASP process. 
z Principle: principle of CLASP [14]. 
z Security pattern: we adopt the patterns by Yoder and Barcalow [16]. 
z Guideline: we adopt web application design guideline by Microsoft [8] and Mozilla secure coding guideline [3]. 
z Rule: we adopt the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) Cheat Sheet [15]. 
z Attack pattern: we adopt Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) [9]. We associate each 
attack with “Spoofing,” “Tampering,” “Repudiation,” “Information disclosure,” “Denial of service,” and 
“Escalation of privilege” (STRIDE), which is a category of threats [8], because it is often used in threat analysis. 
When a relationship exists between pieces of knowledge, we register the relationship. For example, CAPEC is a 
dictionary for attack. The schema has the item “solution and mitigation.” When the descriptions in the item are found 
in other knowledge such as guidelines or rules, we set the relationships between the attack pattern and guideline or 
rule. 
(6) A case provided for the experiment 
We used the common task for software security proposed by Okubo et al. as a case [12]. It aims at standard data 
for experimenting on and evaluating methodologies developed for secure software development. The task called 
EMSSec is an academic affairs management system for a university whose major functions are management of 
explanatory meeting participants, management of enrolled students, and management of certificates for graduated 
students. The following artifacts are created for the task as a project (hereafter, the common task project): use case 
diagram, class diagram, tree diagram of threats and their countermeasures, and source code written in CakePHP. They 
are created by experts in software engineering and software security. We provided misuse case diagrams we created 
by referring to the tree diagram of threats and their countermeasures and source codes in PHP, and association of them 
with KB as a case [6]. 
Fig. 5 shows a misuse case diagram regarding authentication of the task and associated knowledge to prepare it 
(excerpt). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Example case (extended misuse case diagram and knowledge associated with it) 
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Name
Type
D ate
O rigin
R emark
D etail of the artifact
M isuse case diagram
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I had no knowledge for that, therefore, I learned it from the case example.
4.2. Result 
We show some results of the experiment. 
Fig. 6 represents a misuse case diagram created by participant A and associated software security knowledge. We 
can see  that (s)he selected necessary knowledge by referring to the case from the description, for example, “I referred 
to MITM in the case example” in the “contents for knowledge used.” We can also see some comments that (s)he 
learned from the case because (s)he did not have necessary knowledge. We think these comments suggest usefulness 
of the case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Case created by a participant (extended misuse case diagram and knowledge associated with it) 
 
Fig. 7 shows a list of knowledge associated with the source code of an authentication function. It includes password 
brute-force, dictionary attack and password conjecture that are the countermeasures to the spoofing attack. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Case created by a participant (a source code file and knowledge associated with it) 
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1099 Masahito Saito et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  60 ( 2015 )  1092 – 1100 
We conducted an interview to the participants to investigate whether our system achieved the objectives. 
 
Table 1. Comments from the interview 
Assessment 
items 
Comments from the participants 
Opinion for 
use of stored 
cases 
z    A case provided is useful for discovery of countermeasures although implementation language differs. 
9 As the number of cases is few and the case does not always include all of the countermeasures, for 
example, countermeasures to theft of DB, I had to look into points in question. 
9 Some countermeasures, concretely speaking, session management depend on implementation language. 
In PHP, setting for session management is needed, while Java manages session by default.  
Opinion for 
visualization 
z    Visualization of KB is useful for retrieving knowledge. 
9 It is difficult to search for knowledge that is less used. 
Opinion for 
creating a 
case 
z   I learned security from requirement analysis to design by practice. 
9 It is inconvenient to create artifacts over browsing knowledge because development environment is not 
seamlessly integrated. 
9 Pre-conditions are unclear for both the common task and the task assigned. Therefore it was difficult a 
countermeasure should be addressed by operation, by environment or by development of functions.  
9 It took costs to modify source codes by referring to those created by others. 
9 In this experiment, I do not know whether my code is surely secure because testing is not conducted. 
5. Discussion 
We found some opinions that suggest effectiveness of usage of cases and visualization support. 
z Although programming language is different between the stored case (PHP) and the task (Java), the stored case 
helped both participants understand the way of countermeasures. 
z The function that represents both the relationships among software security knowledge and those between 
knowledge and artifacts in a network structure is useful for retrieval of knowledge.  
On the other hand, we have some drawbacks: 
9 In the item “opinion for visualization,” a participant pointed out that it was difficult to find knowledge of which 
frequency of usage is less by merely visualization. 
9 It takes costs for association of artifacts with knowledge because the environment to create artifacts is not 
seamlessly integrated into our KBMS.  
9 In addition, in the current implementation, an artifact is managed by file as the unit. Therefore as association of 
knowledge is conducted for file, both participants pointed out it was difficult where each knowledge designates 
in the artifact. If elements that compose of an artifact are associated with each piece of knowledge in a software 
engineering environment, we think the relationships between software security knowledge and a part in an artifact 
make clear. 
9 In the evaluation item, a participant pointed out that it is unclear how a case addressed security in the artifact 
because the requirements were unclear in the task. We found pre-conditions should be clarified in the task. 
From this experiment, we confirmed effectiveness of both usage of cases and a visualization function to represent 
both the relationship between software security knowledge and the relationship between artifacts and software security 
knowledge. In addition, we found that creating a case that associates artifacts with the software security knowledge is 
useful for learning. 
On the other hand, some issues were pointed out: even though cases implemented by different languages are useful 
for discovery of countermeasures, countermeasures in the implementation phase are different, therefore cases by 
different languages in the implementation phase are required. It is also necessary to provide a software engineering 
environment that can support artifacts creation and associate artifacts with the software security knowledge. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has described a case-based management system for secure software development that integrates software 
security knowledge base and an artifact management and associates artifacts with software security knowledge. We 
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also conducted an experiment to show effectiveness of the case-based management system. We confirmed 
effectiveness for retrieval of the knowledge by visualization of knowledge base. On the other hand, we found necessity 
to be able to associate knowledge within a development environment. In addition, even though cases implemented by 
different languages are useful for discovery of countermeasures, countermeasures in the implementation phase are 
different, therefore cases by different languages in the implementation phase are required. 
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